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Governing Markets in Gulf States 
MARK THATCHER* 
Abstract 
Gulf states have altered the institutions of market governance as part of new 
strategies to develop their domestic markets and attract outside investment. In a 
sharp break from traditional institutions, several states have created new sectoral 
independent regulatory agencies (IRAs) in key sectors. The paper examines 
when, how and why these agencies have been created in two economically and 
politically strategic sectors – stock exchanges for company securities trading 
and telecommunications – that lie at the heart of new economic strategies. It 
argues that an analytical framework based on internationalization best explains 
the pattern of partial adoption of IRAs in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) 
states. International factors have provided crucial impetus for reform. The desire 
to attract non-Gulf capital and expertise has provided a rationale for IRAs; 
overseas reforms have offered examples to be copied or at least modelled; the 
recommendations of international organizations and free trade agreements have 
aided in legitimating reforms. But the impact of international factors has been 
mediated by domestic conditions, including the extent of oil wealth and the 
position and strategies of national policymakers. As a result, the spread of IRAs 
varies significantly among GCC states. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Since the 1990s several Gulf states1 have sharply altered the governance of their 
markets by adopting institutions widely used in other countries, notably the United 
States and Western Europe. They have ended legal monopolies, established rules for 
competition and delegated powers to regulatory agencies. The spread of such 
institutions is a puzzle: why should Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, 
despite their considerable wealth, adopt reforms that run counter to their traditional 
market and governmental institutions?  
This paper examines the institution of market governance in two sectors – 
stock exchanges for company securities trading and telecommunications. More 
specifically, it focuses on analyses of when, how and why Gulf states have created 
‘independent regulatory agencies’ (IRAs). IRAs are a fascinating example of wider 
changes in the governance of Gulf markets: they represent a clear institutional break 
with the past; they are an importation from abroad; they are closely linked to other 
policies of reforming domestic markets such as liberalization, adoption of 
                                                 
* I wish to thank three referees who provided comments on an earlier draft and especially Fred 
Halliday, who generously provided help and encouragement. I also thank the interviewees for their 
time and assistance. The views expressed remain mine. 
1 Gulf states referred to here are the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states: Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. 
international standards and privatization. Moreover, regulatory agencies form part of 
current discussions over the regulation of complex and large markets, especially in 
finance. 
Stock exchanges and telecommunications are chosen for three reasons. First, 
they are economically and politically strategic sectors. Second, they lie at the heart of 
new strategies by GCC states of attracting inward investment and developing 
domestic markets, both directly and through their linkage to other sectors such as 
banking, tourism and information technology. Indeed, they offer a form of ‘critical 
case’ for the extent of change in market governance institutions in the Gulf because 
they are the most likely sectors to experience reform. Third, IRAs have spread in 
these two sectors across several Gulf states in recent years or are the subject of current 
debate, revealing the forces and constraints that shape change. 
There follows a short overview of the context of market governance and the 
spread of agencies in securities trading and telecommunications in Gulf states. The 
paper then introduces theoretical analyses by setting out three broad interpretations of 
changes in governance: national choice based on a principal–agent model, cross-
national diffusion of institutions, and an internationalization approach focusing on the 
interaction between international factors and domestic policy processes. Thereafter it 
looks in detail at the creation of agencies for stock exchanges and 
telecommunications. The conclusion offers some wider discussion about changes and 
challenges in the governance of markets in GCC states. 
The central argument is that IRAs have spread in telecommunications and 
stock exchanges in GCC countries. But also they have spread unevenly, with some 
states not adopting them or only creating agencies that lack sufficient formal or legal 
independence from governments to qualify as IRAs. This pattern of the partial 
adoption of formal Western institutions is best explained by an internationalization 
model that involves interactions between specific international forces and domestic 
factors. The key international forces have been the desire to attract non-GCC 
investment and expertise, cross-national learning and ‘modelling’ from overseas 
institutions from outside the Gulf. However, domestic factors have been central for 
whether, when and how such learning and modelling takes place and their 
institutional impacts. Thus IRAs have been created when national policymakers, 
notably unelected rulers, have developed focused strategies, often because they feared 
a lack of energy wealth and were very keen to attract inward investment. There is a 
 2
paradox that strong leadership by unelected rulers can aid swift change whereas 
stronger, more independent legislatures can limit new institutions. Equally, high 
energy reserves can limit the perceived need for reforms. Hence international factors 
have been crucial for the spread of IRAs, but their impacts also depend on domestic 
conditions. 
The paper focuses on decisions to create IRAs. It does not look at their 
performance or their effects on economic outcomes, which would require a separate 
paper. The very sharp change in institutions governing markets is in itself an 
important political and governmental phenomenon to be explained and understood 
before looking at subsequent developments.  
2. OVERVIEW OF MARKET GOVERNANCE AND THE SPREAD OF AGENCIES 
The states of the Gulf enjoy many economic advantages, notably high levels of wealth 
thanks to oil and gas. But they also face strong challenges (for an excellent analysis 
see Shochat, 2008). Their populations are growing rapidly. Oil and gas prices are 
highly volatile. Overseas investment by GCC states has met resistance, demands for 
reciprocal access to Gulf markets and pressure for the adoption of ‘international’ 
regulatory standards. Their security is uncertain. 
At the same time, important differences among GCC states should be noted. 
Several states have limited energy reserves (notably Bahrain and Dubai), while others 
have plentiful oil and gas supplies and hence face much less need to develop non-oil 
industries (especially Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar and Saudi Arabia). The nature of 
wider government reforms also shows variation. Thus, for instance, Kuwait’s 
parliament is seen as one of the most independent and powerful, with contested 
elections, and Dubai has sought to adopt Western institutions, whereas Saudi Arabia 
has retained more traditional approaches to government. 
In response to economic, political and security challenges, Gulf states have 
adopted radically new economic strategies since the 1990s, although the extent and 
timing of change have differed across countries. One part of that strategy involves 
building companies with major overseas stakes, both through national companies 
expanding abroad and through sovereign wealth funds; such expansion is not the 
subject of this paper, but is an important factor insofar as altering domestic markets is 
seen as a quid pro quo for overseas expansion by domestic companies. 
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The other part of GCC economic strategies is the development of domestic 
markets and companies through the entry of overseas firms both as suppliers and 
investors. Very importantly, ‘internationalization’ primarily refers to the world 
outside the Gulf – interviewees emphasized that they were focusing on non-Gulf 
investors. It has been seen most clearly in telecommunications and stock exchanges, 
but also to a lesser extent in banking and infrastructure development and sometimes 
even in the core energy sectors.  
A key part of attracting non-GCC investors has been the adoption of Western 
formal institutions and rules. One element has been liberalization – that is, ending 
legal monopolies and rules restricting inward investment. Another has been 
corporatization, as existing telecommunications companies have been transformed 
into quoted companies, and sometimes privatization. But a third, key, element has 
been the creation of IRAs. 
IRAs have been seen as offering a number of advantages for attracting inward 
investment from outside the Gulf, especially in stock exchanges and 
telecommunications. They are claimed to offer reassurance to investors that they will 
be treated fairly, notably compared with local investors. This is crucial in 
telecommunications, in which there are heavy sunk investments, and also in stock 
markets, where investors worry about insiders who may enjoy privileged information 
and treatment. IRAs may set clear predictable rules so that investors can plan for the 
long term. Equally, they are designed to set rules to govern liberalized markets in 
ways that allow new entrants to compete fairly with incumbents. Enhanced efficiency 
is another aim of IRAs, as policymakers seek organizations that can recruit the best 
personnel on the basis of merit, including from abroad. More generally, it has been 
hoped that IRAs may be able to resist short-term pressures from governments and 
domestic interests, and instead will follow longer-term policies based on clear 
principles. 
Given that many regulatory bodies can be called independent, it is important 
to define and set minimum conditions for IRAs. An IRA is a regulatory organization 
separated from government ministries and from suppliers. It can be defined as a body 
given powers under public law, whose head has a degree of tenure and which has its 
own organizational resources. These minimum institutional features mean that, in 
formal institutional or legal terms, IRAs enjoy provide a degree of independence both 
from governments, which cannot simply dismiss the head of an IRA or remove its 
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resources, and from suppliers, who face a body with its own legal and organizational 
resources.2 Not all agencies are IRAs – it is possible to have specialized regulatory 
agencies that lack the formal institutional or legal independence from governments to 
qualify. It is also crucial to note that these institutional features refer to the formal 
institutional independence of IRAs from governments – which is distinct from their 
independence in practice from both governments and regulated interests. This paper 
examines the creation of formally independent agencies. 
Table 1 summarizes the spread of IRAs in securities trading across GCC 
states. Hence it examines whether an IRA has been established, the date of its 
creation, and its key institutional features. Within the United Arab Emirates (UAE) it 
also examines the two largest emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai, as stock exchange 
regulators have also been set up at the emirate level. The table shows that three states 
(Dubai, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) have created fully fledged IRAs. Kuwait is actively 
discussing an IRA. However, three states have followed alternative institutional 
reforms – the UAE and Oman, which have agencies that lack sufficient formal 
independence to qualify as an IRA, and Bahrain, which has given regulatory functions 
to the central bank. 
Table 1. IRAs for stock markets in GCC states 
GCC 
country 
IRA Date created Key institutional 
features 
Bahrain No: the central bank 
(Bahrain Monetary 
Agency) is the 
regulator. 
  
Kuwait Under discussion – 
planned for 2008. 
  
Oman No: the Capital 
Market Authority 
(CMA), established 
in 1998, is a 
government authority 
responsible for 
organizing and 
overseeing the issue 
and trading of 
securities in the 
Sultanate.  
  
                                                 
2 Thereafter the degree of formal independence is a variable, depending on many factors, ranging from 
powers of reappointment to length of term and continuing government controls. See Thatcher and 
Stone Sweet (2002), Gilardi (2002).  
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GCC 
country 
IRA Date created Key institutional 
features 
Qatar Qatar Financial 
Centre Regulatory 
Authority (QFC). 
2005: QFC Law 
(Law No. 7 of 2005) 
was signed by the 
Emir of the State of 
Qatar on 9 March 
2005 and became 
effective on 1 May 
2005. 
Regulates financial 
services firms that 
conduct regulated 
activities in, or from, 
the QFC. 
Has an appeal body, 
the QFC Regulatory 
Tribunal. 
Plan to have unified 
financial regulator 
overseeing banking 
and securities by 
2008/2010.3
Saudi Arabia Capital Market 
Authority – 
‘government 
organization with 
financial, legal and 
administrative 
independence. It 
reports directly to the 
Prime Minister.’ 
2003: The Capital 
Market Law (CML) 
was issued by Royal 
Decree number m/3 
dated 31/7/2003. 
Board composed of 
five members, who 
shall be natural Saudi 
Arabian persons. 
Financial budget 
submitted to ministry 
of finance. 
UAE federal 
level 
Emirates Securities 
and Commodities 
Authority – although 
it has a legal 
personality it is not an 
IRA because it is 
headed by 
representatives of 
ministries. 
2000: Federal Law 
No. 4 of 2000 
concerning the 
Emirates Securities 
and Commodities 
Authority and 
Market. 
 
Regulates UAE 
domestic securities 
market, e.g. Abu 
Dhabi securities 
market and Dubai 
financial market. 
Dubai Dubai Financial 
Services Authority 
(DFSA). 
Dubai Law No. 9 of 
2004, The Law 
Establishing the 
Dubai International 
Financial Centre. 
Regulates the 
international market, 
Dubai International 
Financial Centre 
(DIFC), including 
Dubai International 
Financial Exchange 
(DIFX), acting under 
a separate legal 
system. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the spread of IRAs in telecommunications across GCC 
states. It shows that two states (Bahrain and the UAE) have created specialized 
agencies that can qualify as IRAs. Of these, the most formally independent is the 
                                                 
3 See Financial Times, 17 July 2007. 
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Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) in Bahrain. Three other states 
(Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia) have also set up sectoral agencies, but because of the 
powers that remain in the hands of ministers, they do not have sufficient legal 
independence to qualify as fully fledged IRAs.  
Table 2. IRAs in telecommunications 
GCC country Sectoral IRA Date created Key institutional 
features 
Bahrain Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority 
(TRA). 
2002. Strong formal 
independence, e.g. 
powers vested in 
General Director, 
appointed for one 
term, but this is 
renewable and 
General Director is 
difficult to dismiss. 
Kuwait Under discussion – 
planned for 2008; at 
present the regulator 
is ministry  
of posts and 
telecommunications. 
  
Oman No: Sultanate  
of Oman 
Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority 
is chaired by a 
minister. 
2002 Three full-time 
members but 
chaired by minister 
of transport and 
communications 
Qatar No: ictQATAR. 2004 and 2006: a 
2004 emiri decree 
gave ictQATAR the 
authority to regulate 
the country’s 
telecommunications 
market. Decree Law 
Number 34 of 2006 
gives ictQATAR a 
full range of powers 
to regulate the 
telecommunications 
market in Qatar. 
ictQatar headed by 
the Supreme 
Council for 
Communication 
and Information 
Technology, 
chaired by the 
minister. 
Saudi Arabia No: a sectoral body, 
the Communications 
and Information 
Technology 
Commission 
(originally  
2001 Telecoms law. The Commission’s 
Board is chaired by 
the minister, and 
membership 
includes 
‘representatives’ 
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GCC country Sectoral IRA Date created Key institutional 
features 
called Saudi 
Communications 
Commission),  
lacks sufficient 
independence to 
qualify as an IRA.  
from the ministries 
of the ministry of 
PTT, the ministry 
of finance and 
national economy, 
and the ministry of 
commerce. 
UAE federal 
level 
Telecommunications 
Regulatory Authority 
(TRA) of the United 
Arab Emirates. 
UAE Federal Law 
by Decree No. 3 of 
2003, Telecom Law. 
Managed by a 
board of directors, 
comprising five 
board members, 
including the 
chairman and the 
Director General. 
The Board is 
appointed by 
resolution of the 
Supreme 
Committee for a 
period of four years 
renewed for similar 
periods; its 
dismissal is only 
possible on grounds 
stated in the law.  
 
Overall, the tables show a remarkable spread of specialized sectoral agencies 
across most Gulf states in both telecommunications and securities trading. Several of 
these agencies enjoy substantial legal independence from governments and can be 
qualified as IRAs, but others do not, notably because government ministers chair or 
sit on their boards.  
The decision to create IRAs calls for analysis and explanation because they 
mark a sharp break with the general government and political structure of GCC states. 
Establishing IRAs involves the legal separation of public agencies from governments 
by formal delegation of powers and the setting out of explicit statutory objectives and 
powers. Yet most GCC states have relatively small populations, are led by major 
families and hereditary rulers and have traditions of informal consultation or much 
interlinkage between society and state. Indeed, Gulf states have no administrative or 
political tradition of IRAs or similar structures, in contrast, for instance, to the United 
States, which had regulatory commissions dating from the late nineteenth century, or 
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Britain, which had parliamentary commissions in the nineteenth century. Hence 
creating new structures based on transferring powers, formality and the separation of 
an agency from the state and society is a real innovation for GCC states. 
The creation of IRAs is also surprising given the history of 
telecommunications markets and stock markets in Gulf states until the 1990s. Both 
sectors were small and had few services. They were regulated by traditional 
institutions, notably government ministries and, sometimes, associations of suppliers. 
They were publicly owned and largely inward-looking, towards the domestic or GCC 
market. The role of non-GCC suppliers and investors was very small.  
At the same time the spread of IRAs in stock exchanges and 
telecommunications has been uneven among GCC states: some countries have not 
(yet) established IRAs, while others have created specialized agencies that are closely 
linked to governments, such as those in Saudi Arabia. This suggests that the ease or 
difficulty of establishing IRAs and/or the desire for IRAs varies, reflecting contrasts 
both in wider government structures and in economic strategies. 
Explaining why IRAs have been established (and sometimes why they have 
not been created) calls for theoretical tools to guide empirical study. 
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORKS FOR STUDYING THE SPREAD OF IRAS 
Reform of market governance and the spread of IRAs have been studied both in 
Europe and elsewhere.4 Among the diverse literature, three analytical frameworks 
have emerged that offer well-developed explanations relevant for GCC states: a 
national model of delegation based on principal–agent explanations; an international 
diffusion model; and an internationalization model based on the interaction of 
international and domestic factors. 
The national delegation approach suggests that national policymakers choose 
to establish IRAs following a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of 
delegation.5 Creating IRAs takes resources of time and money; moreover, 
policymakers are handing over powers to IRAs, which may use them in ways 
undesired by the former, leading to ‘agency losses’. But IRAs can bring advantages 
for national governments and politicians. The literature often underlines economic 
                                                 
4 For the spread of IRAs see Thatcher (2002), Levi-Faur (2003) and Gilardi (2005). 
5 This is based on principal–agent theory; for reviews in political science see, e.g., McCubbins (1985), 
Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast (1989), Huber and Shipan (2000), Bendor, Glazer and Hammond 
(2001) and, more generally, Epstein and O’Halloran (1999). 
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advantages. A key benefit for developing countries is argued to be enhanced ‘credible 
commitment’, that helps to reassure investors, especially overseas ones, that if they 
sink their investments now, future returns on those investments will not be taken away 
by government intervention (cf. Levy and Spiller, 1996). Investor fears are a 
particular problem in industries such as telecommunications and in securities trading; 
in the former, large sunk costs are often required for new networks, while in the latter 
investors fear sudden changes such as exchange-rate restrictions, new taxes, unfair 
market advantages for privileged actors or the suspension of ordinary trading rules in 
periods of market turbulence. It is also important in countries with histories of 
unpredictable regulatory changes. Since IRAs are separate from the government and 
are given explicit duties and powers, they offer a means of enhancing the credibility 
of promises to investors about future regulation. 
Policymakers may also choose to delegate powers to IRAs in order to achieve 
higher regulatory efficiency to deal with increased technical complexity; a specialized 
organization may be better placed to develop expertise than, for instance, a 
government department. Regulatory complexity increases both with technological 
change and with liberalization, which usually requires setting rules to deal with 
competition. Both stock markets and telecommunications have become much more 
complex, because of both technological change and liberalization. Finally, 
policymakers may also choose to create IRAs to shift blame for unpopular decisions 
or to deal with international organizations which make rule-making more complex or 
which limit the discretion of national governments and hence their ability to use 
regulation in ways that benefit them. 
The second approach is to look at the international diffusion of institutions. It 
suggests that, since states are interlinked, decisions in one country affect and are 
affected by prior decisions in other states, sometimes transmitted or mediated by 
international organizations. As a result, similar institutions can spread across very 
diverse states, leading to the international diffusion of institutions. Hence it has been 
claimed that in the past decades there has been the diffusion of ‘liberal’ economic 
institutions across the world (Simmons and Elkins, 2004; Simmons, Dobbin and 
Garrett, 2006). 
There are several possible mechanisms for the transnational diffusion of neo-
liberal institutions. It may occur through coercion, be this through legal requirements 
and conditions set by international organizations or through manipulation of costs and 
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benefits as dominant countries affect the incentives of others or set international 
norms. In both telecommunications and securities trading, powerful states which are 
responsible for large shares of the world market (notably the United States and many 
EU countries) have adopted IRAs. Equally, international organizations such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
have clear policies favouring IRAs and can make membership or loans dependent on 
adherence to their policies. 
‘Regulatory competition’ can also result in diffusion, as rival states alter their 
domestic institutions to make themselves more attractive to international investors and 
companies (see Radaelli, 2007). If a country fails to match them, it risks losing out. In 
stock exchanges and telecommunications, IRAs can form part of strategies to attract 
international investors by the promise of better-quality regulation. Learning offers a 
third mechanism for diffusion, as countries may look to the experiences of others and 
draw lessons (see Bennett, 1991; Rose, 1993; Campbell, 1998). A fourth and closely 
related mechanism can be emulation or ‘modelling’, when countries follow global 
norms of ‘best practice’ regarding institutions, even though they cannot evaluate the 
costs and benefits of those institutions, which in fact may not be appropriate for their 
domestic circumstances. (cf. Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; McNamera, 2002). Since 
IRAs for telecommunications and securities have been adopted in many countries, 
notably in western Europe, the third and fourth mechanisms would mean that other 
countries follow the example of these ‘policy leaders’. Indeed, sociological versions 
of the diffusion model argue that countries adopt overseas examples regardless of 
whether those examples are appropriate or increase efficiency (cf. McNamera 2002). 
Hence they would claim that IRAs, which were developed in Western states, are 
imported into other political and administrative systems even if they do not in fact 
offer the benefits that the principal–agent model suggests they should. 
The third analytical approach is an ‘internationalization’ analysis, based on the 
‘second image reversed’ (see Gourevitch, 1978 and Katzenstein, 1978). It focuses on 
how and why international factors enter and are used in the domestic policy process. 
Early work examined how changes in the costs and benefits of cross-border economic 
exchanges, notably cross-border trade, affected incentives to alter domestic policies 
(see Milner, 1988; Milner and Keohane, 1996; Frieden and Rogowski, 1996). More 
recent studies have argued that ‘policy forms’ of internationalization can also be 
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crucial, such as the policies and institutions of powerful overseas nations or supra-
national regulation (Thatcher, 2007). Hence they suggest that economic costs and 
benefits are not the only form of international influence on domestic decisions. They 
also point to the vital role of international factors in the political process – especially 
in providing impetus for national policymakers to alter their strategies and in creating 
new reform coalitions and overcoming opposition. 
The internationalization literature claims that responses to internationalization 
are strongly influenced by domestic factors as international factors become enmeshed 
in national politics. They can offer national policymakers opportunities to legitimize 
institutional reforms, but also margins of choice, as they can interpret and use 
overseas experiences, giving rise to differences in processes of reform, strategies 
and/or outcomes (Katzenstein, 1985; Gourevitch, 1986; Hallerberg and Basinger, 
1998; Thatcher, 2007). 
Thus an internationalization approach suggests that analysis of the spread of 
IRAs should focus on how altered international factors modify the incentives, 
resources and coalitions of policymakers within the domestic policymaking process. It 
points to the increasing internationalization of both securities trading and 
telecommunications markets as likely to affect reform of domestic institutions through 
higher cross-border exchanges, the potential for international regulatory competition 
and cross-national policy learning and modelling due to reforms in different states, 
and the expansion of supranational regulation. 
The literature on delegation, international diffusion and internationalization 
can be used to generate three sets of propositions regarding the spread of IRAs and 
explanatory factors and processes. The first, based on the delegation model, points to 
the national context and suggests that national policymakers carefully weigh up the 
costs and benefits of delegating to IRAs and then choose whether or not to do so. If 
they create IRAs it is because of the benefits that IRAs bring them, notably enhancing 
credible commitment, responding to increased complexity, shifting blame for 
unpopular decisions and dealing with international organizations. This approach 
implies that several of the stated reasons for creating IRAs in GCC states discussed 
above in section 2 are in fact sufficient to explain their spread – that is, IRAs have 
been adopted because they perform useful functions for national policymakers, such 
as attracting inward investment thanks to enhanced credible commitment and more 
efficient regulation. At the same time, it predicts that if national circumstances and 
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institutions vary so that they affect the need for IRAs and/or the benefits of IRAs for 
national policymakers, there will also be significant variations in the spread of IRAs 
across countries. 
The second literature, on policy diffusion, locates the impetus for delegation in 
the international environment and suggests that national policymakers are strongly 
influenced by overseas decisions. Indeed, it implies limited choice for countries which 
are swept along in international institutional reform waves through processes such as 
coercion, competition with the cross-national learning of other states and emulation. 
An international diffusion approach would predict that similar institutions spread 
across GCC states despite domestic differences, as national policymakers are forced 
into adopting IRAs or in fact learn or copy overseas examples regardless of 
differences in their domestic institutions and circumstances. 
The third literature, on internationalization, argues that international factors 
(which can be technological and economic but also the policies of other countries and 
supranational regulation) are crucial for decisions on institutional reforms through 
their effects on the domestic policy process. They provide impetus for reform by 
altering the incentives, opportunities, strategies, coalitions and legitimizing arguments 
of national policymakers to reform institutions. Hence it would suggest that overseas 
factors have been central in GCC states’ deciding to create IRAs, especially by aiding 
reformers and weakening their opponents. But, in contrast to the diffusion literature, it 
examines the interaction of those factors with domestic policymaking and institutions 
that mediate and mould responses to the international forces for change. Thus it 
predicts considerable differences in the effects of international factors and also in 
outcomes if domestic conditions also vary. 
The three literatures are valuable in providing factors and mechanisms to look 
for. Analysing the factors suggested by the three models requires detailed process-
tracing and consideration of the empirical evidence. Given industry differences, stock 
exchanges and telecommunications are analysed separately.  
3.1. The spread of IRAs for securities trading in Gulf states 
Until the 1980s there were no formal stock exchanges in GCC countries. Instead, very 
small informal over-the-counter markets existed, often in shops or markets. They 
were largely unregulated, or at most were supervised by associations of traders. 
Attempts were made in the 1980s to expand stock markets in order to aid the private 
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sector and reduce dependence on governments.6 In particular, the official Kuwait 
Stock Exchange was established after the 1982 Al-Manakh crash involving the 
existing over-the-counter market, the Bahrain stock exchange was set up in 1987 and 
the Oman exchange in 1989 (World Bank, 2004).7 The stock markets were usually 
publicly owned. Often they were ‘regulated’ through broadly drafted laws and very 
loose rules drawn up and enforced either by the central bank (e.g. Bahrain after 1987) 
or by a combination of the finance ministry and ‘self regulation’ by an association of 
traders (e.g. the Kuwait Stock Exchange). Trading was very limited in volume.8 
Stocks were domestic; insofar as overseas stocks were traded, they were for firms 
from neighbouring Gulf states. Often trading was dominated by shares in government-
owned companies, largely because most privately owned companies were family 
owned. There were very few rules governing trading – for instance, insider trading 
was not an offence. Moreover, stock exchanges suffered from problems involving 
speculation, insider trading and sudden price rises and falls (see, e.g., Financial 
Times, 4 December 2000). In addition, the 1990 invasion of Kuwait greatly damaged 
the Kuwait Stock Exchange, which had been the oldest and largest in the Gulf. 
The period from the late 1990s onwards saw pressures and opportunities for 
change in stock exchanges. Wealth is concentrated, and much is held outside the 
region.9 However, obstacles to investment and transfers of funds in Western countries 
emerged, with much greater suspicion of Islamic banks, especially after 9/11, giving 
incentives to find regional opportunities for Gulf investors.10 At the same time, 
private companies faced difficulties raising finance from local stock markets, and 
were highly dependent on governments or banks or otherwise international financi
markets, which in turn demanded state guarantees.
al 
competition to GCC states; in particular, Jordan set up an IRA for securities in 
                                                
11 Other Arab states began to seek 
to develop stock markets with IRAs in order to attract capital, offering regulatory 
 
6 For an analysis see Financial Times, 12 July 1988. 
7 For Oman see Allen and Rigsby (2000); for background analysis see Financial Times, 12 July 
1988. 
8 One estimate was that the Dubai OTC market had c. 26 listed securities before 2000 and trading 
amounted to a few thousand dirham (interviewee 10). 
9 One estimate is that in 1998 the 350,000 wealthiest Gulf nationals, representing 2 per cent of the 
region’s population, owned US$800 billion of assets, half of which were held abroad (Financial 
Times, 26 March 1998).  
10 See e.g. claims that Islamic banks ‘funded extremist organizations’ (Financial Times, 21 Oct. 2001). 
11 For instance, in 1998 the state-owned Saudi Arabian Airlines failed to raise US$4.5 billion capital 
from local stock markets and found that international markets demanded a sovereign guarantee 
(Financial Times, 26 March 1998). 
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1997.12 Meanwhile, a major boom in GCC stock markets during the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, due to loose credit provided by banks (which also profited from share 
sales), was followed by a major downturn in 2005–6 that led to large losses for 
investors, with many markets falling by 25–50 per cent (cf. Middle East Economic 
Digest, 24 November 2006, p. 88).13 Strong discontent arose over the lack of rules o
matters such as insider trading, with public demonstrations in some countries 
(interviews; La Tribune, 15 March 2006).  
In this new context, Gulf states began to reform
n 
 their stock markets.14 They 
sought s. 
 
ld of 
e initiative to create the DIFC was taken by the then Crown Prince His 
Highne
d 
ose of 
olved substantial changes in regulation. A 
separate stock market – the Dubai International Financial Exchange (DIFX) – was 
                                                
to develop alternative sources of investment for citizens and finance for firm
But several also aimed to attract non-GCC capital to build up a strong international 
financial sector, with attendant revenues, employment and growth. The earliest and 
most far-reaching reforms were in Dubai. Lacking large oil revenues, it has sought to
develop itself as a hub or international or ‘world city’, with high-class infrastructure – 
an international airport, a first-class airline, tourist attractions, spectacular new 
buildings and tax-free zones (cf. Marchal, 2001, and Davidson, 2007). In the fie
finance it created the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), initially launched 
in 2002 and then legally established in 2004.15 This followed a change in the UAE 
(federal) constitution in 2004 to allow individual emirates to establish free trade 
zones.16  
Th
ss Sheikh Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum (now Emir of Dubai) 
(interviewees 9 and 10). It formed part of an overall strategy of developing an
diversifying Dubai in response to its lack of oil (interviewees 10 and 12). The 
ambition was to create a regional financial centre, using a time zone between th
Tokyo, London and New York, aimed at international investors from outside the GCC 
countries (interviewees 10 and 12). 
The creation of the DIFC inv
 
12 The Jordan Securities Commission, created by Securities Law, No. 23, 1997. 
13 For instance, the Tadawul all-share index for the Saudi Arabian stock market fell 52.5 per cent in 
2006 (La Tribune, 30 Jan. 2007). 
14 For data on stock market sizes, see Appendix and also Shochat (2008).  
15 UAE Federal Decree No. 35 of 2004, establishing the DIFC as a financial free zone in Dubai Middle 
East, and Dubai Law No. 9 of 2004, The Law Establishing the Dubai International Financial Centre; 
for a discussion see Middle East Economic Digest (10 Jan. 2004, p. 8). 
16 Federal Law No. 8 of 2004, Regarding the Free Trade Zones. 
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hed for international investors and stock. The DIFX is regulated by an IR
established specifically for the purpose, namely the Dubai Financial Service Author
(DFSA).17 In contrast the existing local exchange, the Dubai Financial Market 
(formally established in 2000)18 remained a domestic market regulated by the 
Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA), whose board is chaire
the minister of finance and commerce and hence is not sufficiently legally sepa
from the government to be an IRA.19 Moreover, Dubai has established an 
international financial and legal ‘island’ to attract overseas investors and trading. 
Almost all dealing within the DIFC were exempt from UAE civil law. Inst
legislation was passed to create a judicial system for the DIFC largely based on th
Anglo-Saxon legal system, under the DIFC Judicial Authority.  
The DFSA was created to help attract international capital and to ensure high
standards of corporate governance (Interviewees 9 and 12). It followed a study in 
 by, the consultant group McKinsey that argued for a special financial services
regulator. In addition, policymakers wished to meet the principles of IOSCO, whic
state that ‘The regulator should be operationally independent and accountable in the 
exercise of its functions and powers’ (IOSCO, 2003; interviewee 8). The Crown 
Prince and his advisors looked at overseas examples, notably Britain, the United 
States and Hong Kong (interviewees 10 and 12). But the British Financial Service
Authority (FSA) was the ‘primary model’ for the DFSA (interviewee 9). Indeed, 
DFSA was largely planned by Philip Thorne, a former managing director of the FSA
and Ian Hay Davidson, former managing director of Lloyds of London, who became 
respectively its chief executive and chairman. There was little opposition to the idea 
of a separate regulator within Dubai, in large measure because the DIFC was an 
international zone with a separate market for regional players; only business parts of 
the DIFC expressed some opposition, being used to conducting business in a 
traditional manner (interviewee 9). The creation of an IRA with substantial legal 
independence from far from easy, however. In June 2004 Thorpe and Hay-Da
were dismissed from their posts at the DFSA. Reported reasons included their des
to create an IRA that was independent from the DIFC and the application of rules to 
 
17 In 2007 a holding company, Borse Dubai, was created to own both DIFX and the Dubai Financial 
Markets. 
18 Establishment of the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (ESCA) by virtue of Federal 
Law No. 4 of 2000. 
19 ECSA also regulates the Abu Dhabi Securities Market. 
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land deals conducted by members of the DIFC board (interviewees 8 and 9; Financial
Times, 28 June 2004; 13 July 2005). After pressure from the DFSA board, the then 
Crown Prince decided to pass the legislation that granted the DFSA substantial 
independence as well as placing the DIFC under its own separate legal system, 
modelled on Anglo-Saxon structures and principles (interviewees 8 and 9).  
The result was that Law No. 9 of 2004 in respect of The Dubai Internatio
Financial Centre was enacted on 13 September 2004. It set out the powers an
 
nal 
d 
functio
 
e 
 is 
en to dismissal 
 
 
ntre 
ces, the QFC Regulatory 
Author
 were 
n to 
                                                
ns of the DIFC, including the DFSA. It gave the DFSA considerable legal or 
formal autonomy and powers. Thus it gave the DFSA its own legal personality,
allowing it to sue (and be sued).20 It made the DFSA the sole body responsible for th
regulation of financial services in the DIFC and able to carry these out ‘without 
interference from any other body’ and accountable only to the DIFC 
president/governor who is appointed by decree by the Emir of Dubai. The DFSA
headed by a regulatory council appointed for fixed terms and only op
for cause in accordance with the DIFC’s laws and regulations. The council is 
responsible for supervising the DFSA and managing its executive. The DFSA’s tasks
include proposing legislation to the DIFC’s president, making policies, issuing
regulations and carrying out ‘solely and in an independent manner the licensing, 
registration and supervision’ of DIFC establishments. 
Interestingly, Qatar followed Dubai in establishing the Qatar Financial Ce
(QFC) in 2005.21 It included an IRA for financial servi
ity (QFCRA). The provisions were very similar to those in Dubai, and the 
QFCRA enjoys considerable legal independence and powers.22 Such similarities
perhaps not accidental as, following his exit from the DFSA, Philip Thorne went o
head the Qatar authority. However, unlike Dubai, Qatar did not establish a separate 
international stock exchange but instead is seeking to develop the Doha exchange, 
which it had set up in 1995–7, notably by allowing non-Qataris to buy up to 25 per 
cent of companies quoted on the Doha exchange in 2005. Qatar is following the 
British FSA model to a greater extent than other GCC countries by creating a new 
single unified financial regulator in 2008 that will oversee all financial services, 
including banking, and will take over the central bank’s existing units and the 
 
20 See Article 7 for many of the specifications about the DFSA. 
21 See Law No. 7 of 2005, On the promulgation of Law for the Qatar Financial Center, 
22 Indeed, in some respects it has greater independence; for example the provisions on the dismissal of 
board members are more specific than those for in Dubai. 
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QFCRA (Financial Times, 17 July 2007; Middle East Economic Digest, 14 
September 2007). 
Saudi Arabia has also set up an agency to regulate financial services,
Arabia Capital Mar
 the Saudi 
kets Authority (CMA), created in 2003.23 It followed concerns that 
the Uni
y’s 
 
 
d 
e 
 
 been no move 
 
As, other GCC countries have followed 
differen
ank 
r 
m 
d yet developed in the 
period 1999–2002, when reforms were being debated (interviewee 15). The British 
                                                
ted States was no longer as good a destination for Saudi investments, 
especially after 9/11, and the creation of the Saudi Stock Exchange as a corporate 
body, separate from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA), the countr
central bank (Financial Times, 22 August 2002; Middle East Economic Digest, 14 
November 2003). The institutional design of the CMA took elements of the British
FSA and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Hence the CMA is a
government organization, headed by a board of five full-time persons, each appointe
for a fixed term of five years, renewable once. It has legal personality, powers to issu
rules and regulations, and legally specified duties to ensure the development and 
proper functioning of the exchange. But the extent of delegation and 
internationalization is less than in Dubai and Qatar; the CMA reports to the prime
minister, and its members must be Saudi nationals. Equally, there has
to introduce a separate legal system. 
While Dubai, Qatar and Saudi Arabia have radically reformed their regulatory
institutions by establishing sectoral IR
t paths. Bahrain has chosen to reform securities regulation and move away 
from self-regulation, but has chosen a supervisory model based on the central b
being a single regulator for the entire financial sector. Thus in 2002 responsibility fo
supervising the Bahrain Stock Exchange and the insurance sector were transferred 
from the minister for commerce and agriculture to the Central Bank of Bahrain (CBB, 
then called the Bahrain Monetary Agency).24 However, the CBB is not separate fro
the Bahrain Stock Exchange, as its head sits on the Bahrain Stock Exchange board. 
Nor is it formally independent from the government: despite new legislation in 2006, 
its board includes a representative of the ministry of finance.25 
There were several reasons why Bahrain chose not to create an IRA for 
securities. One is that no single dominant international model ha
 
23 Royal Decree No. (M/30) dated 2/6/1424 AH (16 June 2003). 
24 Decree Law 21/2002 with respect to the amendment of some articles of Decree Law 4/1987 with 
respect to the establishment and organization of the Bahrain Stock Exchange. 
25 Central Bank of Bahrain and Financial Institutions Law 2006, Art. 5. 
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FSA w el had 
inancial 
spite 
 
but 
BB 
s 
d 
 
essity for the creating of powerful IRAs. Kuwait had the 
oldest G
s not an 
oblems because of being responsible for 
many f
C)) to 
as new and not yet tested, and indeed a single European institutional mod
not emerged. There were alternative models and, instead, Bahrain looked at 
Singapore, where the Monetary Authority of Singapore – the central bank – 
supervises the entire financial services sector. Policymakers argued that Singapore 
was a good example for Bahrain, in terms of becoming a dominant regional f
centre and enjoying rapid economic development using human capital and de
lacking natural resources. However, a second factor was the strong resistance by the
CBB to losing any of its powers, a position that was supported by the Prime Minister 
and the Crown Prince. A third reason was that Bahrain has a strong banking sector 
a much smaller securities one, and hence there seemed good reasons to keep 
regulation of the two together. Finally, the central bank argued that establishing a 
separate IRA for securities would have meant duplication, higher costs and, perhaps 
more importantly, finding skilled staff. In any case, the government and the C
invited the IMF and the World Bank to assess the position. Its report in 2006 was 
largely favourable towards the central bank’s regulatory activities, although it noted 
that the CBB should obtain greater formal independence from the government (thi
was before the law of 2006) (IMF 2006a, esp. pp.13–16). Moreover, Bahrain joine
IOSCO, which validated the model of the CBB as regulator. Hence while 
international pressures favoured the separation of operations and regulation, they did
not point unambiguously to creating an IRA, while domestic actors favoured a 
powerful central bank. 
Kuwait offers an interesting counter-example to the other states. It illustrates 
the obstacles to reform and the importance of both central leadership and the 
perceived economic nec
CC stock market, the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE). Since the reforms of 
the early 1980s the KSE has been regulated by a Market Committee, but this i
independent body; instead, it includes several representatives from the government 
and, indeed, from the regulatee, the KSE.  
There have been powerful pressures to reform the regulatory system, including 
creating an IRA. The Central Bank of Kuwait and the finance ministry wish to 
develop the KSE, while the former faced pr
inancial suppliers (interviewees 1 and 3). They invited the World Bank and 
outside consultants (McKinsey and the International Securities Consultancy (IS
undertake studies in order to gain outside support for change (interviewees 1, 3 and 
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5). The 2004 World Bank report argued that the Market Committee was inadequate
saying that it ‘has not been delegated appropriate powers and responsibilities to 
enable it to act as an independent regulatory agency or to oversee the development o
an efficient, fair and transparent securities market’ (World Bank, 2004, p. 5). A repor
by the IMF in 2006 again criticized regulatory arrangements for the stock exchan
and repeated the call for reform, suggesting ‘establishing comprehensive oversight of 
the stock exchange’ (IMF 2006b and more generally IMF 2006c). Similarly, the 
consultants recommended reform and pointed out that Kuwait’s regulatory institution
were insufficient (interviewees 3 and 6). Another pressure for change was the desire 
to meet IOSCO’s requirements concerning the independence of the regulator, wh
the Market Committee did not. Moreover, the KSE has faced the danger of capital 
outflows, as large investors and companies have been switching their investments to 
other GCC stock exchanges and it has attracted fewer international investors than 
other exchanges. One reason for this is believed to be the weaknesses of supervision
in Kuwait, especially its not meeting international standards (interviewees 1, 3 and 7;
Emirates Business, 24/7, 6 October 2008). Finally, there was considerable domesti
discontent when, following a large-scale boom, there was a sharp crash in 2005–6, 
when allegations of market manipulation were made (interviewee 1; Zawya, 8 
Noveember 2007). There is recognition that an IRA is needed because of the Market 
Committee’s lack of sufficient independence from the KSE and the fact that its 
members may face a conflict of interest between their roles as regulators and as
market participants (interviewees 3 and 6). 
In response to these pressures Kuwaiti policymakers – notably the minist
commerce, the central bank and the KSE’s leadership – began discussing the cre
of an IRA in 2005. Detailed legislative prop
, 
f 
t 
ge 
s 
ich 
 
 
c 
 
ry of 
ation 
osals were made by an academic, Dr 
Amani 
ch up 
from 
Bouresli, from the University of Kuwait. Her proposals envisaged a Capital 
Market Authority, closely modelled on the US SEC and the British FSA (interviewee 
1). They also suggested that the CMA should be headed by a board of Kuwaiti 
citizens appointed for terms of five years, renewable once, with removal being 
difficult, and that it would have strong powers, notably to punish malpractice, and its 
own budget, funded by the government. The KSE leadership is also keen to ‘cat
international standards’ and adopt ‘best practice’,26 and commissioned a report 
                                                 
26 Quotations are from interviewees 3 and 5; interviewee 4. 
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ISC which also recommended an IRA. The legislative committee of the parliament 
began to look at proposals. 
Yet despite these forces in favour of an IRA, no legislation had been passed by 
August
er 
on, several GCC states have moved or are moving towards 
regulat al 
 
els 
odel seems best suited to explain this pattern. 
Interna
ies 
 radically 
 
s 
 
ere 
ral 
bank). Moreover, the analysis shows that a suitable domestic environment is essential 
 to indicate a paradox: a stronger 
 2008. One reason was the plethora of proposals – no fewer than five were 
made to the legislative committee as the KSE and other reformers failed to agree a 
common position and the Kuwait government did not offer a strong lead. But anoth
reason was the strong opposition to reforms by brokers who feared that the new rules 
would be too strict (interviewees 3, 4 and 5; Zawya, 8 November 2007). Finally, the 
parliamentary system, involving considerable debate and opportunities for delay, has 
made progress slow. As a result, legislative proposals are still being discussed in 
December 2008.  
In conclusi
ory agencies for stock exchanges. But there have been important nation
differences. The institutional forms of agencies differ, with some agencies lacking
sufficient independence to qualify as IRAs. Moreover, alternative institutional mod
to agencies have been followed, notably by Bahrain and Kuwait, which do not have 
IRAs for their stock exchanges. 
The internationalization m
tional factors have been crucial for change. The desire to attract overseas 
investors by establishing new institutions has been a central element in the strateg
of GCC policymakers. Moreover, overseas examples and international organizations 
have provided models, norms and impetus for reform. They have aided the 
development of reform coalitions and the adoption of institutions that differ
from the small, informally regulated exchanges that until very recently were seen in 
GCC states. However, those international factors have interacted with domestic ones.
Thus while overseas examples have been important for change, their effects have 
been mostly in the form of selective learning from abroad, as national policymaker
chose the examples from which to learn. As for international organizations, they have
often been invited to provide advice, which has usually supported the strategy of GCC 
leaders. In addition, international norms have been sufficiently flexible to 
accommodate different institutional arrangements (e.g. the IOSCO norms w
compatible with both IRAs and regulation in Bahrain by a non-independent cent
for reform. Indeed, the case of Kuwait would seem
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elected legislature and more scope for political contestation has led to barriers to 
institutional reform. In contrast, where strong political leadership has been present, 
notably from unelected rulers, institutional change has been more rapid. Overall, 
whilst reforms cannot be understood without the analysis of international factors, 
role of domestic factors has been considerable and has resulted in considerable 
variations among GCC states. 
3.2. The spread of IRAs in telecommunications 
IRAs for telecommunications have been established in several GCC countries. O
common reason has been to dea
the 
ne 
l with liberalization – both attracting overseas capital 
hat would appear to have greater 
g, and 
essential 
 
he 
 
 
l 
 a 
ed by a government 
ministr ould 
and offering a body separate from the government t
impartiality and expertise in dealing with issues arising from liberalization, such as 
interconnection and the selection of licence bidders. Another factor has been 
international norms and organizations. Yet, as with stock exchanges, neither 
explanation is sufficient on it own; although international examples and norms of 
having an IRA create significant pressures, these are not always overwhelmin
several GCC states have not created telecommunications IRAs, nor are IRAs 
for liberalization, as the cases of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait will show. A fuller 
explanation of the changing patterns of governance of telecommunications must look
at the interaction of international factors with domestic politics and policymaking. 
This section examines how and why international factors such as learning and t
desire for inward investment have led to the establishment of IRAs in states such as 
Bahrain and the UAE. In contrast, there are several cases in which domestic factors
have prevented the creation of an IRA. It finds evidence that when there is lengthy
parliamentary involvement, reforms can be held up or blocked, as in Kuwait, 
repeating the paradox seen in relation to stock exchanges that stronger and more 
independent legislatures can hold up the establishment of IRAs. 
Debates about IRAs must be placed in the context of wider institutiona
change in telecommunications. Until the 2000s telecommunications services were
state legal monopoly in GCC countries. They were usually suppli
y, often the posts and telecommunications ministry. The same ministry w
also hold regulatory powers over the sector, notably licensing. However, since there 
was a public monopoly and few services, the main service being fixed line telephony, 
those powers were largely unused.  
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However, international and domestic factors have led to major changes in the 
governance of telecommunications markets. IRAs have been set up in two GCC 
states. The first to establish an IRA was Bahrain in 2002, followed by the UAE 
(which
eads 
n 
power, 
tions IRA (Thatcher, 2002; Levi-
Faur, 2  Egypt 
C 
e sued. 
 
 The 
 
GCC countries by the mid-2000s (Financial Times, 22 June 2005).30 The 
 regulates telecommunications at the federal level) in 2003.27 In formal 
institutional terms these are IRAs: they have legal powers and personality, their h
are appointed for a fixed term and are difficult to dismiss and they enjoy their ow
funding, often from licence fees. In institutional terms the governments retains 
but this is often to appoint the board of the IRA.  
Several reasons lie behind the decision to create an IRA. One has been 
overseas examples. By the 2000s, all EU countries and many others, from Latin 
America to south-east Asia, had a telecommunica
003). Other Arab states began to establish them (e.g. Jordan in 1995 and
in 2003). GCC states looked to overseas examples, both directly and through 
consultants and importation of foreign experts. The similarities between several GC
IRAs and those in Western countries, especially the United Kingdom, are striking. 
The IRAs are usually given legal personality, including the ability to sue and b
They consist of a board of several members; sometimes they are have a director 
general (the equivalent of the chief executive officer of the British communications
regulator, Ofcom). Those members cannot be dismissed except for reasons generally 
specified in the governing law, such as criminal conviction, misconduct or ill-
health.28 The law sets out the IRA’s duties, which cover both competition and such 
objectives as achieving some form of ‘universal service’ and developing 
telecommunications activities.29 These bear strong similarities to the list of duties 
given to Britain’s telecommunications IRA, Oftel, in the 1984 Telecommunications 
Act (see Thatcher, 1999). 
In addition, international norms created incentives for setting up an IRA.
WTO agreements on telecommunications and information technology were signed by
several 
                                                 
27 Federal Law by Decree No. 3 of 2003, Telecom Law. 
28 See e.g. for UAE, Federal Law by Decree No. 3 of 2003, Telecom Law, Art. 11. 
29 See e.g. Chapter 2 Art. of the Qatar Telecommunications Law of 2006, or Art. 7 of Oman’s 
Telecommunications Act of 2002.  
ed the WTO Information Technology 
ommunications 
ts that 
notably involving interconnection, and having an independent 
30 Thus Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, for example, have sign
agreement, while Oman joined the WTO in 2000 and hence signed the WTO telec
services agreement, making commitments to liberalize the entire sector, to ensure arrangemen
allowed fair and effective competition, 
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United States has put pressures on GCC states to alter governance arrangements 
(interviewee 13; Financial Times, 22 June 2005); one element has been the signat
of bilateral free-trade agreements with the United States.
ure 
telecom  new 
 
e to 
ally 
 related to liberalization, has been the desire to attract 
inward
for new licences. Many bidders have been telecom companies based in other GCC 
atari 
 
31 These agreements specify, 
in language similar to that of the WTO, that both sides must have an IRA which must 
act impartially; equally, they stipulate privatization of operators and insist on allowing 
competition and the development of rules to ensure that competition is fair.32  
A third reason for the spread of agencies has been the liberalization of 
munications markets. Within GCC states demand has been growing for
services from both households and businesses, especially for financial services which
have become a priority sector for many GCC states (interviewee 13). Moreover, new 
services have emerged that can be more easily opened to competition than fixed line 
telephony, notably mobile services, which then needed regulation.33 Even fixed line 
services are being opened up to competition.34 An IRA is useful in dealing with 
liberalization by offering an impartial body which also has the technical expertis
deal with issues that may be politically difficult and/or purely technical, such as 
interconnection costs or tariffs. Such a body, separate from government, is especi
valuable in GCC countries, since incumbent telecommunications operators remain 
state-owned (interviewee 13). 
A fourth reason, closely
 investment, especially in new services. Third-generation mobile services 
provide the clearest example: almost all GCC states have encouraged overseas bidders 
states – for instance, in Oman, the second mobile licence has been award to the Q
                                                                                                                                           
regulator that was ‘separate from, and not accountable to, any supplier of basic telecommunications 
services’. See WTO (2000). 
31 For instance by Bahrain in 2004 and by Oman in 2005. 
32 See e.g. Art. 12(7) of the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and 
the Government of Bahrain on the Establishment of a Free Trade Area, which states that ‘Each Party 
shall ensure that its telecommunications regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any 
supplier of public telecommunications services’, ‘Each Party shall ensure that the decisions and 
procedures of its telecommunications regulatory body are impartial’, and ‘Each Party shall maintain 
the absence of or eliminate as soon as feasible national government ownership in any supplier of 
public telecommunications services’. 
33 Thus, for instance, in Kuwait the number of mobile subscribers rose from 21.74 per 100 inhabitants 
in 2000 to 91.49 in 2007, and in Bahrain from 30.61 to 122.88. Similarly, the number of internet 
subscribers rose very sharply, e.g. in the UAE from 6.45 per 100 inhabitants in 2000 to 20.64 in 2007 
(see Appendix). 
34 Thus, for example, the UAE sold a second fixed licence in 2005, which was won by du, offering a 
fixed line alternative to the incumbent Etisalat since 2006; Saudi Arabia is also opening up its fixed 
line market. 
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Telecommunications Company (Nawras) while the third-generation mobile licence in 
Kuwait was awarded in November 2007 to Saudi Telecom. Several bids, however, 
have involved consortia of Middle-Eastern and Western companies.35 An IRA is able 
to handle competing bids and can be seen to be impartial. It can increase the 
credibility of state commitments in the eyes of overseas entrants, who can worry 
either that their bids will not be fairly treated or that regulatory conditions will change 
once they have made their investment (Levy and Spiller, 1996). 
The policies of Gulf states in telecommunications have therefore changed,
ways similar to those for stock exchanges. They seek the creation of a well-
functioning telecommunications market as part of wider strategie
 in 
s of attracting inward 
investm
s and 
 of 
how to 
usiness centre in the region in order to increase future revenue (Bahrain 
has few  
 
ees 
 
y 
                                                
ent and economic development, both in the telecommunications sector and in 
other strategic sectors such as finance. They have therefore ended monopolie
sought to create regulators that are seen as impartial. They have given licences to 
overseas operators – both from other GCC states and from outside. In addition, their 
own incumbent operators have expanded abroad, especially in other GCC states, 
through overseas subsidiaries, the purchase of overseas operators and taking 
licences.36 
The case of Bahrain offers a clear illustration of the reasons for the spread
IRAs in telecommunications. For Bahrain a major question in the 2000s was 
become a b
 oil or gas revenues). A key sector is finance, and indeed banks pressed for the
liberalization of telecommunications (interviewee 13). The government asked its 
Economic Development Board to examine the issue, but also invited consultants and
an international US-based law firm (White and Case), who recommended an IRA 
largely modelled on overseas IRAs, notably that of the United Kingdom (interview
13, 16 and 17). A key argument was the desire to meet international ‘best practice’. 
Another reason was that Bahrain wished to sign a free trade agreement with the 
United States as part of a wider political relationship with and recognition by the 
United States, and that agreement required an IRA for telecommunications 
(interviewee 17). The policy obtained support from the highest level. Indeed, the
overall strategy of liberalization and institutional reform was strongly supported b
 
35 E.g. Vodafone in Bahrain, or the Nordic operator TDC as part of Nawras in Oman. 
36 Examples include Etisalat, which has licences in other GCC states but has also bought stakes in other 
operators, e.g. the Pakistani operator Pakistan Telecommunication Company Limited in 2005. 
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the Crown Prince, who emphasized the importance of attracting internationa
investment and telecommunications providers (Interviewee 16).  
As a result, the Telecommunications Regulatory Authority (TRA) was create
in 2002 as an independent legal entity.37 The approach ‘very much followed U
thinking’, as Britain was seen as having a well-developed regulato
l 
d 
K 
ry system that was 
more ap
ar to 
 
s 
e 
 
. 
tions 
r 
internationalization for telecommunications in Bahrain. At the regulatory level, many 
                                                
propriate than the US system, which was seen as too convoluted and lacking 
flexibility (interviewee 17). The TRA’s duties and powers were remarkably simil
those of the British IRAs, notably the telecommunications regulator Oftel and its 
successor Ofcom.38 Thus, for instance, the TRA was given duties of protecting the 
interests of subscribers and users over tariffs, ensuring service provision, quality of 
service and protection of privacy, promoting effective and fair competition and 
ensuring that licence applicants could provide the services for which they were 
applying. It was given powers to enforce the law, notably to ensure compliance with
licences and to review tariffs. Equally, the TRA’s structure has strong similaritie
with the chief executive and board structure used by Ofcom since 2000. Thus th
TRA’s powers are exercised by a general director, who is appointed for a three-year 
term, renewable only once, with dismissal only being possible for certain specified
grounds (such as misconduct) through a decree issued by the Council of Ministers
The TRA is supervised by a board of directors, who are appointed for three- or four-
year terms. The TRA has been given a degree of financial autonomy from the 
government in that it is funded from fees, fines and annual fees on licensees up to 1 
per cent of their turnover, and it uses its funding to pay salaries and for operations. 
The minister’s main role is to set policy through a three-yearly Telecommunica
Plan; the TRA is to ‘act in manner that is consistent with the objectives’ of the Plan, 
provided that this does not derogate from its independence’.39 Otherwise the ministe
can only intervene indirectly, such as through appointing the members of the TRA 
board, who in turn choose the TRA general director.40 Hence, in formal institutional 
terms, the TRA has significant separation from the government. 
The decision to create the TRA forms part of a wider strategy of 
 
37 Legislative decree No. 48 of 2002, promulgating the Telecommunications Law. 
m, the Office of 
39 ns Law, s. 3(e). 
 in Batelco, the incumbent operator. 
38 Oftel was the telecommunications regulator in 1984–2000, now replaced by Ofco
Communications. 
 Telecommunicatio
40 In addition, it owns a majority share
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overseas personnel have taken senior positions within the TRA, thus, for example, the
TRA’s first general director, Andreas Avgousti, was a former Dir
 
ector of Competition 
and Fai  his 
 
ission 
lify as a 
A. In particular, the communications minister chairs the board, which 
also inc
or 
l-
s 
                                                
r Trading at the British telecommunications regulator Oftel, while
successor, Alan Horne, had worked for British Telecom and then for a consultancy 
company in Britain. The TRA’s approach has been closely modelled on that of 
foreign institutions, especially that of Britain – for example, in its approach to 
competition.41 It has centred on liberalization and the entry of new overseas 
companies.42  
Three GCC states have sectoral agencies that are not IRAs. One is Saudi
Arabia, which created the Communications and Information Technology Comm
(CITC) in 2001, but left it insufficiently separate from the government to qua
fully fledged IR
ludes ‘representatives’ from the PTT, finance and national economy, and 
commerce ministries. Similarly, Qatar created a specialized agency, ictQatar, in 2004, 
whose highest body, the Supreme Council for Information and Communications 
Technology, contains members of the government.43 However, interestingly, the lack 
of an IRA has not prevented liberalization. Thus in Saudi Arabia the CITC govern
declared in 2004 that its aims were to encourage both foreign and domestic 
investment and to introduce competition into the sector (interview, Mohammed A
Suwaiyal; Middle East Economic Digest, 23 July 2004, pp. 30–5). Indeed, Saudi 
Arabia awarded a second GSM (Global System for Mobile communications) mobile 
licence in 2005 to Mobily, a consortium led by the UAE telecommunication
incumbent Etisalat44 and a third one in 2007 to the Kuwaiti/Bahrain supplier MTC 
(Middle East Economic Digest, 10 August 2007, p. 20). It also began the 
liberalization of fixed line telephony, involving ten bids for a second licence that led 
 
41 For example in interconnection or in the emphasis on sustainable competition; see TRA Bahrain 
en bids, mostly from overseas companies, while two new national fixed wireless 
iary 
43
eral is to carry out the operations of the Supreme Council; see 
44
fering (IPO). 
Annual Reports. 
42 For instance, the second mobile licence was awarded in 2003 to MTC-Vodafone after a bidding 
process that saw t
service licences were issued in 2006–7 to MTC-Vodafone Bahrain and to Mena Telecom, a subsid
of Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain). 
 The 2006 legislation is complex, as although powers are given to both the Supreme Council and the 
General Secretariat, the Secretary Gen
notably Arts. 2–5 of the Telecommunications Law of 2006. 
 Etisalat owns 35 per cent, with 45 per cent held by six strategic local partners; the remaining 20 per 
cent was put up for public subscription in an initial public of
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to three bids being recommended, all of them by consortia led by overseas suppliers
The CITC ran the bidding process and made recommendations to the Saud
(cf. Financial Times, 15 July 2004; Middle East Economic Digest, 21 and 23 July 
2004, 19 January 2007). 
The experience of Saudi Arabia is interesting, as it shows that a fully fledged
IRA is not essential for policies of liberalization and inward investment. Hence a 
simple functionalist expla
.45 
i cabinet 
 
nation that the establishment of IRAs follows changing 
market
 
is strongly desired for several reasons which 
illustra ract inward 
t 
e. 
it-
wait 
they wo 7, 
r the 
‘An independent telecommunications authority to regulate the market is the thing that 
 
 needs is insufficient. Equally, it shows the extent to which governance of the 
largest GCC market is developing and the strength of forces for change that apply 
even in an oil-rich and large country. 
The most different case among the GCC states is Kuwait. 
Telecommunications remain regulated by the ministry of communications. An IRA
has been discussed for some time and 
te the pressures to create IRAs. One factor is the need to att
investment and boost investor confidence (interviewee 2). Thus, for instance, Kuwai
is undertaking liberalization measures such as seeking bids for a third mobile licenc
The need for reform was underlined when Zain (formerly MTC), a large Kuwa
based new entrant with subsidiaries and stakes across the Middle East, announced in 
September 2007 that it would move the headquarters of its international operations 
unit from Kuwait to Bahrain; one reason for this may have been difficulties in Ku
concerning legal regulatory barriers linked to the lack of an IRA (interviewee 13; 
AMEinfo, 19 September 2007; reporting by Reuters, Arab Times, 1 October 2007). 
Another reason in favour of an IRA in Kuwait is to ensure that the market 
works properly (interviewee 2). In particular, issues such as interconnection, 
monitoring of prices and frequency management are difficult, and it is argued that 
uld be helped by an IRA. (interviewee 2; Kuwait Times, 14 November 200
reported in TMC Net). This need is becoming stronger as more operators ente
Kuwaiti market, notably different operators in mobile telephony. As Gamal Anwar 
Al-Sadat, the chairman of Easytel, a company advising the Kuwait ministry put it, 
                                                
45 Consortia led by Bahrain Telecommunications Co., Hong Kong’s PCCW and US Verizon 
Communications (Financial Times, 12 March 2007; Arab News, 22 April 2007), although at present 
there is only one fixed licence issued – see 
www.citc.gov.sa/citcportal/GenericListing/tabid/104/cmspid/{B4A40E7A-F8F8–4C1E–8B15–
4DDFC32282DC}/Default.aspx. 
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makes businesses breathe; the authority is the fair judge between all operators’ 
(Kuwait Times, 14 November 2007, reported in TMC Net). A final reason is the des
to meet international norms. Kuwait is the only GCC state without an IRA for 
telecommunications. As one senior policymaker put it, ‘everybody is doing it’ 
(interviewee 2). 
Discussions about creating a telecommunications IRA have been going on for 
some years in Kuwait, and there is little opposition in principle. Yet no IRA ha
been set up. One reason appears to be that ministers have different views. Anoth
may be that Kuw
ire 
s yet 
er 
ait is not looking at other countries as models or examples 
(intervi
t, 
 
encies 
that hav
ies. 
nd 
ct 
ountries have been radically reformed. New 
stock markets have been created, with formalized rules or even their own legal 
 into 
ve been 
ewee 2). However, an IRA was planned for the next few months, to coincide 
with the launch in 2008 of a third mobile network, empowered to implement policy, 
license services, enforce rules and deal with disputes (Middle East Economic Diges
10 August 2007; Kuwait Times, 14 November 2007, reported in TMC Net). 
Thus, overall, several GCC states have created IRAs for telecommunications.
The desire to attract outside investment and to regulate newly liberalized markets 
have been significant factors, as well as the influence of overseas examples and 
international norms and incentives. But other GCC states have established ag
e only limited formal independence and hence do not qualify as IRAs, while 
Kuwait has continued with regulation by the posts and telecommunications ministr
The overall pattern therefore suggests that international factors offer incentives a
reasons to create IRAs for telecommunications, but that domestic circumstances affe
whether and when they do so or instead establish other forms of agency or continue 
with traditional regulatory structures. 
4. CONCLUSION: CHANGES AND CHALLENGES IN THE GOVERNANCE OF GCC 
MARKETS 
The formal institutions of governance of both securities trading and 
telecommunications markets in GCC c
systems. Telecommunications suppliers have been transformed from ministries
legal corporations and supply has been liberalized. Overseas firms ha
permitted to enter both stock markets and telecommunications. Most importantly, a 
central institutional reform has been the establishment of specialized sectoral 
agencies, and in particular IRAs, to regulate the two sectors.  
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This paper began by putting forward three explanatory models for the creatio
of IRAs, namely a national model based on principal–agent theory, a cross-nat
diffusion model and an internationalization model. Each used 
n 
ional 
different factors to 
explain
ts 
 
d 
l factors 
ithin 
rnational 
 
nctional advantages of IRAs for policymakers put forward by 
princip
ed 
on or 
 
s have sought to attract inward investment and 
liberali
 a 
 be 
 why IRAs are created and offered diverse explanations and hypotheses about 
the spread of IRAs across countries. The national model argues that national 
policymakers rationally calculate the costs and benefits of creating IRAs. It predic
that IRAs are created to perform useful functions for policymakers, such as enhancing
credible commitment or shifting blame. If wider national institutions and 
circumstances vary, so should the spread of IRAs, as the costs and benefits for 
national policymakers will differ. The diffusion model suggests that IRAs spread 
across states through mechanisms such as learning, coercion, modelling an
regulatory competition. They will do so across countries with diverse domestic 
circumstances as cross-national linkages overcome the effects of domestic 
differences. Finally, the internationalization approach argues that internationa
influence the incentives, opportunities and strategies of national policymakers w
domestic arenas and hence are crucial in explaining their decisions. But inte
factors interact with domestic institutions and circumstances, so that their impact on 
decisions varies.  
Which of these approaches best explains the pattern of the spread of IRAs in 
GCC countries in the case of stock markets and of telecommunications? The analysis
suggests that the fu
al–agent models of delegation have certainly been a significant factor in 
reform. The desire to attract international capital by enhancing credible commitment 
through new institutions appears to have been an important factor. Equally, the ne
to deal with difficult and technically complex issues such as regulating competiti
spectrum management were also present. Other reasons put forward by the principal–
agent model seem less important, notably blame-shifting and dealing with demands 
from international organizations. 
However, pressures arising from the desire for enhanced credible commitment
or dealing with increased complexity seem to be insufficient conditions for the 
creation of IRAs. Several countrie
zed their markets without an IRA – for instance, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in 
telecommunications. Others have found alternative institutional models, such as
central bank regulating stock exchanges (notably in Bahrain). Although there may
 30
pressures to establish an IRA in order to attract overseas capital or deal with complex
issues, countries can resist those pressures or find alternative institutional response
Moreover, GCC states have much capital available to them, whereas the reforms have 
been aimed at attracting non-GCC investors, indicating that change has been driven 
by policy choices rather than the simple need to attract capital. 
Several of the factors put forward by the cross-national diffusion approach 
have also played a significant role in the spread of IRAs. Cross-national learning and
mimetism or modelling were very important, although coercion
 
s. 
 
 and regulatory 
compet
 
 
  
, 
have 
Dubai a
y 
had 
or 
ve 
despite 
y the internationalization approach. This suggests that international 
factors 
ition appear to have been relatively limited. It is noteworthy that GCC 
policymakers looked to Western countries, especially Britain, aided by consultants 
and senior personnel drawn from there. Moreover, the World Bank and the IMF
produced reports urging reforms. Hence many institutional features such as the
structure of a board and duties centred on competition were copied into GCC IRAs.
At the same time the analysis shows the limits of overseas examples. First
cross-national learning and mimetism have been selective – GCC policymakers 
‘learned’ when and whence they wished. Hence in securities trading, for example, 
nd Qatar looked mainly to Britain, whereas Bahrain chose to emulate 
Singapore rather than western Europe. Second, the World Bank and the IMF were 
often invited by domestic officials to make reports, and perhaps unsurprisingly, the
often produced advice that was close to that desired by the policymakers who 
requested them. Thus these reports recommended IRAs in some countries, but not f
others (e.g. securities trading in Bahrain). Finally, cross-national learning and 
mimetism have sometimes been insufficient to lead to change, as some countries ha
chosen not to follow the example of overseas IRAs or have been unable to because of 
domestic opposition. Hence, for example, Kuwait has not yet introduced IRAs 
looking to overseas reforms, while Saudi Arabia has chosen to establish agencies that 
are not IRAs. 
Perhaps the most complete explanation of the pattern of governance reform – 
not just the spread of IRAs, but also other forms of agency and sometimes no agency 
– is provided b
can play a crucial role in domestic reform but also underlines their interaction 
with national circumstances. In GCC countries, the desire to attract non-Gulf capital 
and expertise have provided a rationale for IRAs. Equally, overseas reforms have 
provided examples to be copied or at least modelled. In addition, the 
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recommendations of international organizations such as the World Bank and IOSCO 
and free-trade agreements with the United States have aided in legitimating reform
But it is important to recognize that these international factors
on their own. One reason is that international examples are numerous and often 
ambiguous, and hence are open to selective learning. Another is that they are 
s.  
 are not decisive 
insuffic
ually 
ntry to 
s 
ty 
me domestic opposition. Thus Dubai’s strategy of international development 
based o
re 
 
 
ble rules and organizations. 
Howev
he 
ient to overcome domestic obstacles to creating an IRA. Moreover, 
institutional alternatives to IRAs exist. Equally, the influence of international 
organizations has depended on being invited to give advice, which, as seen, us
accords with the preferences of domestic reformers and differs from one cou
another. 
Hence the impact of international factors is conditioned by domestic strategie
and conditions. It varies according to the strategies of national leaders and their abili
to overco
n importing Western institutions such as IRAs stands in contrast with less 
dependent agencies created in Saudi Arabia, while Kuwait is engaged in a lengthy 
process of reform that involves several proposals and considerable discussion by the 
parliament. There is a paradox that Kuwait’s relatively more independent legislatu
that is the subject of contested elections has been an important constraint on the 
adoption of IRAs, whereas strong leadership by non-elected rulers in other countries 
has aided the spread of IRAs. Finally, it is perhaps unsurprising that reforms to create
IRAs and alter governance institutions have gone furthest in Dubai and Bahrain, 
which lack oil revenues, whereas they have been more limited and slower in Kuwait 
and Saudi Arabia, which have massive energy reserves.  
This paper has focused on the establishment of formally or legally 
independent regulatory agencies rather than their behaviour. IRAs are often seen as an
essential step towards creating markets bound by predicta
er, once created, they then need to develop in ways that create confidence in 
non-GCC overseas investors about their future treatment if they are to succeed in 
attracting such investors. They require sufficient expertise to be capable of regulating 
complex markets in ways that involve economic, political and social choices. They 
need to develop a practical autonomy in practice from governments, which can be 
tempted to intervene for their own short-term interests. Equally, they must be 
independent of local interests, so that the application of rules is seen to be the same 
for domestic as for overseas parties. These challenges are common to IRAs across t
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world, but are stronger for new IRAs and also in countries that lack the traditio
administrative and political institutions for delegating power and separating certain 
decisions from domestic political and social pressures. Establishing formally 
independent IRAs can be the first step in a process of developing the rule-bound 
governance of markets that enjoys a degree of autonomy from short-term domestic 
interests. The economic crisis that has developed since 2007/8 will test the stre
IRAs and their ability to act independently of governments and domestic interests
More generally, it will open questions about the strategy of attracting outside 
investment and the role of IRAs in the development of telecommunications and 
financial markets. If the internationalization analysis offered in this paper to explain
how, when and why IRAs have been created applies also to the functioning of
we can also expect both that international factors will be crucial for the operation
IRAs and that domestic conditions will affect responses to such factors, so that there 
will be significant variations across GCC nations.  
Thus the response to why IRAs and other types of agency have spread in GCC
states involves analysing the interaction of international factors with domestic 
conditions and strategies. International factors can p
ns and 
ngth of 
. 
 
 IRAs, 
 of 
 
rovide impetus and legitimation 
for inst
he 
itutional changes such as the establishment of new agencies. But they are 
mediated by domestic factors. The overall result has been a sharp alteration to t
formal institutions governing GCC markets but also important differences between 
GCC states. 
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APPENDIX. DATA ON GCC STOCK EXCHANGES AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
MARKETS 
Table 1. Stock exchanges, February 2008 
 Year of commencement 
of stock trading 
Name of market, year 
established 
Number of listed 
companies 
Bahrain 1957 Bahrain Stock 
Exchange, 1987 
(operating 1989) 
50 
Kuwait  1952 Kuwait Stock Exchange, 
1977 
195 
Oman 1988 Muscat Securities 
Market, 1988 
124 
Qatar 1997 Doha Securities Market, 
1995 (operating 1997) 
40 
Saudi 
   Arabia 
1935 Tadawul, 2001 
(organized stock market 
since 1984) 
115 
Abu Dhabi 1989 Abu Dhabi Securities 
Market, 2000 
66 
Source: Shochat (2008, p. 45).  
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Table 2. Key data on GCC stock market size and activity, yearly summary  
Year  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Value traded      
Abu Dhabi Securities Market       3,335.56 26,691.37 17,907.82  42,825.18 
Bahrain Stock Exchange        254.69        413.76        600.96        1,228.91        816.07 
Doha Securities Market       1,645.86 25,407.03       0,334.48  24,738.05  
Dubai Financial Market 11,628.46 105,277.66       3,657.37  89,904.85  
Kuwait Stock Market 53,300.18 51,637.18       3,990.64  55,714.14 120,659.30 
Muscat Securities Market       1,224.38     1,895.70       2,999.96        2,073.74 4,714.61 
Saudi Stock Market 158,567.51 446,898.51      68,216.79  1,331,782.90 628,055.57 
 
 Shares traded      
Abu Dhabi Securities Market        651.79     7,834.90 10,371.63  47,599.04 
Bahrain Stock Exchange        368.49        311.77        378.75         663.15        683.84 
Doha Securities Market        67.54        934.20       1,869.76       2,761.28  
Dubai Financial Market       4,148.97 24,233.67      39,167.73  92,438.70  
Kuwait Stock Market 48,765.60 33,433.37      50,815.60  35,520.20 66,206.68 
Muscat Securities Market        275.98        336.97        399.84         867.62 2,721.80 
Saudi Stock Market       5,531.22     9,887.70      10,826.73  53,879.96 53,083.03 
      
Market capitalization      
Abu Dhabi Securities Market 55,519.12 125,646.08      71,688.79  112,159.52 
Bahrain Stock Exchange       9,701.77 13,513.18      17,276.34  21,122.84 26,795.93 
Doha Securities Market 40,435.90 87,140.94      60,913.09  95,517.99  
Dubai Financial Market 35,109.07 108,774.68      86,871.72  138,697.83  
Kuwait Stock Market 61,311.56 73,769.25    139,486.14  141,923.18 193,513.28 
Muscat Securities Market       6,615.17 –      10,928.07  13,036.98 22,767.03 
Saudi Stock Market 157,164.12 305,954.25    647,502.66  326,364.47 522,721.12 
 
 Number of transactions      
Abu Dhabi Securities Market 62026 531093 665415 987469  
Bahrain Stock Exchange 14200 14948 20994 16110 24004
Doha Securities Market 70275 1012174 1736160 1524306   
Dubai Financial Market 182094 1644448 2375247 2007151   
Kuwait Stock Market 1066078 1052820 1908475 1397529 1976340
Muscat Securities Market 178163 250873 337959 285737 524019
Saudi Stock Market 3742102 12616825 13283983 12985128 11343727
Source: AMF (Arab Monetary Fund), available at 
www.amf.org.ae/AMF/WebSite/weblisher/storage/uploads/docs/economic%20dept/amdb%20update/m
arkets%20performance/yearly%20performance/yearly%20summary.htm. 
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Table 3. Mobile cellular subscribers in GCC countries 2000–7 
3.1. Mobile cellular subscribers, 2000 
CAGR 
  
 
(000s) 
 
 
(%) 
 
Per 100 
inhabitants 
As % total 
telephone 
subscribers 
 1995 2000 1995– 2000    2000    2000 
Bahrain 27.6 205.7 49.4 30.61 54.6 
Kuwait 117.6 476.0 32.3 21.74 50.5 
Oman 8.1 162.0 82.3 6.63 42.2 
Qatar 18.5 120.9 45.6 19.90 43.0 
Saudi Arabia 16.0 1,375.9 143.7 6.40 31.7 
United Arab Emirates 129.0 1,428.1 61.8 43.98  
 
3.2. Mobile cellular subscribers, 2007 
CAGR 
  
 
(000s) 
 
 
(%) 
 
Per 100 
inhabitants 
As %  total 
telephone 
subscribers 
 2002 2007 2002–7   2007   2007 
Bahrain 389.0 1,116.0 23.5   148.28 82.4 
Kuwait 1,227.0 2,773.7 17.7 97.28 83.0 
Oman 463.0 2,500.0 40.1 96.33 90.3 
Qatar 266.7 1,264.4 36.5 150.41 84.2 
Saudi Arabia 5,008.0 28,381.
0 
41.5 114.74 87.7 
United Arab Emirates 2,428.1 7,594.5 25.6 173.37 84.6 
 
Source: ITU annual report. 
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Table 4. Internet development in GCC countries, 2000–7 
4.1. Internet development, 2000 
 Internet Broadband subscribers 
 Subscribers 
  (000s) 
Subscribers 
per 100 inhab.
Users
(000s)
Users per  
100 inhab. 
 Total 
 (000s) 
Per 100 
inhab. 
Bahrain 21.9 3.25 40.0 5.95 - - 
Kuwait ... ... 150.0 6.85 ... ... 
Oman 23.9 0.98 90.0 3.69 ... ... 
Qatar 10.5 1.74 30.0 4.94 - - 
Saudi Arabia 200.0 0.93 460.0 2.14 - - 
United Arab Emirates 209.5 6.45 765.0 23.56 1.4 0.04 
 
 
4.2. Internet development, 2003 
 Internet Broadband subscribers
 Subscribers 
  (000s) 
Subscribers 
per 100 inhab. 
Users 
(000s) 
Users per  
100 inhab. 
 Total 
 (000s) 
 Per 100 
 inhab. 
Bahrain 48.9 6.93 150.0 21.25 9.7 1.38 
Kuwait 227.0 9.14 567.0 22.82 13.0 0.52 
Oman 51.8 2.06 210.0 8.36 0.1 0.01 
Qatar 33.3 4.71 140.8 19.93 3.0 0.42 
Saudi Arabia 700.0 3.001,800.0 7.72 46.0 0.20 
United Arab Emirates 347.5 8.601,110.2 27.48 30.3 0.75 
 
 
4.3. Internet development, 2007 
 Internet Broadband subscribers 
 Subscribers 
(000s) 
Subscribers 
per 100 inhab.
Users 
(000s) 
Users per  
100 inhab. 
Total 
(000s) 
   Per 100 
   inhab. 
Bahrain 60.1 8.14 250.0 33.22 38.6 5.23 
Kuwait 283.2 10.54 900.0 31.57 25.0 0.93 
Oman 70.3 2.71 300.0 11.56 18.9 0.73 
Qatar 87.0 10.34 351.0 41.75 70.3 8.37 
Saudi Arabia 1,800.0 7.14 6,200.0 25.07 600.0 2.43 
United Arab Emirates 904.0 20.64 2,300.0 52.51 240.6 5.17 
 
Source: ITU annual report. 
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